What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa

There are times throughout the course of history when a political/military leader refuses to believe the facts before him when they conflict with his pre-conceived notions. Some examples are the Johnson administration's refusal to believe that Vietnam would be a long, hard war that ultimately wouldn't work. Another is the supreme arrogance of Douglas MacArthur who repeatedly stated that that the Chinese would not enter the Korean War to bail out their communist allies.

But the award for the ultimate in political blindness goes to Josef Stalin who ignored the vast apparatus of Soviet and Communist intelligence and chose to believe that Adolf Hitler wouldn't dare attack the Soviet union in the summer of 1941. Stalin's refusal to listen to his agents throughout Europe and his agencies at home led to the most devastating surprise attack in history- the German attack of June 22, 1941.

David E. Murhpy's detailed account of Stalin's unwillingness to accept the facts is an amazing look into one man's ultimate arrogance. Murphy examines all of the avenues through which Josef Stalin was informed of the Nazi attack, and his rock-like stubbornness and refusal to act. Particular interesting are the documents Murhpy provides which appear to be letters from Hitler himself, assuring the Soviet dictator of German loyalty to the non-aggression pact and explaining seemingly hostile troop movements as part of an overall military deception and campaign to take down Britain once and for all. These documents, which even Murhpy cannot substantially validate, could if true be the key to understanding Stalin's actions in 1941.

"What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa" is must reading for students of the Eastern Front in World War II. Casual readers will find a relatively easy read in these pages and will walk away with a greater understanding of Soviet intelligence, military, and political considerations of the era.

Like any armistice after a long and bitter struggle, there was much fraternizing between former enemies when the disintegration of the Soviet Union brought about the end of the Cold War. It is unclear what ex-CIA official David Murphy told his Russian counterparts when the boys got together to talk over old times. Obvious from this book is that the intelligence officials from behind the Curtain took the opportunity to clear themselves and their service of any blame for the most disastrous failure by a head of State in modern times. Though we never can know what remains hidden, there was apparently an unprecedented opening of secret files by the Soviet side, to show how well the spies did their job of informing Stalin of Hitler's preparations to attack the Soviet Union and how fiendishly clever the Nazis were in obfuscating it.

The problem with this book is that the author essentially acts as a mouthpiece for the alphabet soup of former Red spy organs: MVD [military intelligence], GRU, NKGB, RU. The leading spymasters of each organization are profiled as to personal history, accomplishments and ultimate fate, often in numbing detail. Some paid the ultimate price for having been right where the Boss was wrong. Some survived but few prospered.

The author repeats some dubious legends concerning the period of Soviet-German "friendship" such as the existence of a letter to Stalin signed by Hitler giving his word "as a head of state" that the military preparations in eastern Poland were all directed against England. Hitler never signed anything. Examples of his actual signature are extremely rare.

While Murphy is no A.J.P. Taylor for style, the book reads well and is of appropriate length.

Murphy's detailed analysis is thorough and meticulous. The dry bones of this history are the blueprints of the skeleton that is the support structure of the story. Stalin knew plenty and he knew it early. The only thing missing is an analysis of the peculiar mind of a paranoid, which this book does not try to approach, and shouldn't.

It will come as no surprise to even the casual history buff that Stalin totally misread German intentions about Barbarossa, and the Red Army and Soviet citizens paid in blood for his error. David Murphy assembles overwhelming Soviet documentary evidence of the many sources of intelligence reporting which the Soviet military intelligence and NKVD reported on directly to the Soviet leadership leading up to June 22 1941, warning of impending German hostility. What is new is the evidence of Stalin's systematic elimination of all who had knowledge of the advance warnings he ignored, thus ensuring no one lived to tell of Stalin's fallibility. This is a sobering reminder of the immense evil that Stalin personified.

Enigma behind Operation Barbarossa[Hitler's invasion of USSR]has always fascinated me.

Despite receiving intelligence warnings from several sources about an impending German assault,war began disastrously for Soviets.This happened because ,prelude to hostilities ,Stalin practised self deception on a extensive scale.Stalin's folly brought the nation on the brink of collapse.Soviet people paid dearly for their leader's mistake.More than 20 million lives were lost before Red Army managed to evict German invaders from the Soviet soil.

There is no doubt in the "war of wits" which preceded German attack,Hitler throughly foxed Stalin.German Fuehrer was able to read Stalin's mind ;latter's predispositon to a particular line of thinking.This was Nazi Germany will not invade USSR as long as Britain continued to hold out behind natural barrier:English Channel. Strange to say,Soviet leader adhered to this thought despite repeated violations of Soviet airspace by the Luftwaffe.Hitler exploited Stalin's preconception by feeding disinformation via Latvian double agent controlled by Gestapo. Fuehrer's personal correspondence telling some rogue elements in the Wehrmacht were poised to strike;however,he would do his best to stop them further deceived Stalin.

Stalin's experience shows how dangerous it is to prejudge enemy's intentions.One needs to have open mind while evaluating enemy's capabilities,plans.If not,one is bound to fall into a self- made trap.

Fact that Wehrmact also made no preparations to conceal its build-up along Soviet borders confused Stalin. He thought Soviet spies were bluffing regarding an impending German attack. That accounts for his violent outburst against Richard Sorge.

To be fair you cannot expect Stalin to be privy to Hitler's innermost thought [incredibly convoluted logic]that he can bring Britain to heel by striking down Soviet Union.Further Soviet dictator was ,I think,was correct in his thinking that Brtish intelligence schemed to entangle Soviet Union in a war with Nazi Germany.Martin Allen's book Hitler/Hess Deception has unwittingly acknowledged this fact.

Author while striving to unravel mystery surrounding Barbarossa denounces Stalin.He dubs Nazi-Soviet non aggression pact as a cynical move on Stalin's side. True to a certain extent.But to be fair, it was also vaccilation,indifference of Western Allies which gave Stalin an opening to strike a deal with Nazi Germany.