When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler (Modern War Studies)

One of the common myths about Russia's role in the defeat of Hitler and Napoleon is that it was mainly due to the winter and Russia's superior numbers and that the Russians being backward were far inferior in terms of fighting skill ,technology and leadership than either foe and that the West played the major role in defeating Hitler.Whilst it is at least partially true in the case with Napoleon ,it is definitely not true in the case of Hitler.The reason this myth has survived is because of Western pre-conceptions about Russia, memoirs from German generals trying to whitewash their reputations and old war Propaganda by the west.That this is the case can be illustrated by one recent experience that I had.A colleague from work told me that D-day was responsible for defeating Hitler and that America played the chief role.The absurdity of this statement can be shown by the fact that during D-day,the soviets launched Operation Bagration which is actually the worst Wehrmact defeat in the war.
Colonel Glantz traces the development of the soviet military between the two world wars,the initial attack by Hitler,the gradual checking and turning back of the Nazi advance at the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk and the final defeat of the Nazis in a series of well executed offensives starting with Stalin's ten blows in 1944 to the siege of Berlin a yaer later.In doing so, he illustrates the transition of the Soviet military from one wrecked by the purges to one superior to the germans in generalship ,equipment,quantity,doctrine,use of deception and operational art and he shows that whilst the fact that Hitler's micromanagement and Stalin's hands-of approach did play a role it was more due to the fact that the red army was superior to the Nazis in every area except the tactical aspect.A must read for any student of war or the history of world war ii.

I'm not sure who this book would really appeal to. It seems too brief and compact to appeal to scholars or military history buffs. The text is utterly lifeless, so it wouldn't appeal to fans of narrative history. I know it has great virtue in the fact that it examines the conflict from almost exclusively the Soviet point of view, but I'm amazed that such a dramatic story as this could have such a boring presentation.

An amazing blow-by-blow account of the WWII struggle between Germany and Russia on the "eastern front." The authors' credentials are impeccable. In particular, Glantz is recognized as a major authority on WWII and warfare in general. He frequently references his own prior publications in the 60 pages of extensive notes. The story is aided by many well-drawn maps of the various campaigns.

Largely as a result of the immediate commencement of the Cold War at the end of WWII, many western writers have tended to magnify the contributions of the western allies (Britain and the U.S.) to the winning of the war, while deprecating the efforts of Stalinist Russia. Others have seriously suggested that Roosevelt and Churchill intentionally drug their heels in opening the western front, waiting for the Germans and Russians to bleed each other to death before finally entering the fray in a meaningful way.

Glantz contends that. in all fairness, the Western allies were truly not prepared for a major offensive in western Europe until 1944. At the same time he contrasts the relatively minor earlier efforts of the U.S. and Britain in North Africa and the Mediterranean with the huge struggle on the eastern front between 1941 and 1946. Few westerners realize that, by the end of the first two years of the conflict, the Russians had suffered over 20 million casualties (killed, missing or wounded.) By the end of the war, their losses had mounted to over 30 million military casualties, with untold numbers of civilians who perished. German losses were proportionally great. It is telling that the Germans considered their efforts on the western front as more of a "civilized" kind of warfare, compared to the unspeakable horrors and atrocities involved with the eastern front. Throughout the war, the great bulk of their best troops and armaments were sent to (and perished in) the east.

After finishing this book, I was compelled to consider what the outcome of Hitler's aggression would have been if he had been wise enough to maintain his early non-aggression pact with Stalin and been able to concentrate his forces in the west. It seems credible that his single greatest strategic mistake was his decision to attack Russia shortly after the conquest and partition of Poland. It seems certain that Europe would be a different continent than it is today. Also, as Glantz points out in his closing chapter, the Russians were not unreasonable in their determination to control the eastern European countries after the war. They had suffered unimaginable losses during the war, which was merely the most costly of the many times they had suffered invasion from the west. Their attitude of "never again!" hardened and led to their subsequent over-commitment to building their military institutions. This myopic interest in military strength contributed greatly to the economic problems that eventually led to the collapse of the soviet system several decades later.

In addition to their prodigious knowledge of modern warfare, the authors benefited greatly from relatively recent access to Russian military archives. Reading this account of the struggle on the eastern front will enable a western audience to better understand not only the terrible conflict that took place between Germany and Russia during WWII, but also the factors that contributed to the modern Russian attitudes and policies concerning geopolitics. This book is a valuable contribution to our understanding of historical and political events during the last half of the twentieth century.

The book begins at the end of WWI and explains the Communist Revolution, the subsequent civil war and the war doctrine that developed over the next 20 years that would "prepare" Russia for the next German invasion. A part of that evolution of history will include the peace and economic pacts between Germany and Russia. It will also mention the impact of Tukhachevsky, Triandafillov and others will have on the Red Army doctrine. The influence of Stalin and the aggressive nature with the Baltic States, Poland and Finland as well as with Japan is covered.

As 1941 approaches, opposing armies are discussed including plans that each combatant adopts. A basic Order of Battle is provided. The rest of the narrative is the operational highlights, both large and small, of the war. After the introduction, there are 241 pages devoted to the war that includes the opening days of Operation Barbarossa to the capturing of the Reichstag in 1945. Its so loaded with operational information (theres no anecdotal experiences and outside of the introduction little political coverage) that first time readers will have a good basic understanding of the war by the time they finish the book. It would also be an excellent primer, a foundation when you read Mr Glantz's other books which are more demanding.
In addition to the facts of the war, Mr Glantz provides commentary and analysis to help the reader understand the significance of the battle action.

There are also 22 photos and 22 maps. The maps are of the style found in the author's "Leningrad" and "Kursk" books. The maps are good and will help the reader follow the battles. It will also help the new reader digest the maps in Glantz's other books when their interests grow beyond this summary. The photo gallery is completely Russian related; many showing their commanders and soldiers in the field. Though the Geman side is not ignored, the book clearly leans toward Russia.
There is also an Appendix of five tables of statistics that include casualties, casualties by campaign, weapon production, war time strengths. The 60 page Notes section is also an important source of information if further reading is desired. A useful Index completes the book.

This is a good choice if you're new to the war or if you wanted just a few books of the war in your library or if you're a David Glantz fan. Its highly recommended.

The book is of particular interest for Russian military history scholars and
has certain value for general public.
An account of the Soviet-German War is given from quite balanced prospective
of a modern American Military. Very good job is done on analysis of facts and tendencies
(at the end of each Chapter and at the end of the book). Particularly interesting are
notions of psychological traps and misconceptions in which Hitler and Stalin, German and Sovier Higher Commands fell in; limited but not negligible role of lend-lease and Allies operations on Western front. One remarkable drawback of the book is vague understanding of German losses in operations which are given on base of memoirs of survived (and beaten) German field-marshalls rather than on concrete archives and comprehensive analysis of data. Similar work has been done by Russians (summarized by heavily cited fundamental book of Krivosheev). Without such factual material, the direct comparison of the state and progress of military skills and military art of Germans and Soviets is lacking objectivity and based more on literary skills of post-war
analysts (where German generals made successful attempts to look smart and wise) rather than on reality (which at the end proved Russian superiority). Recommend for critical reading.